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Jurisdiction in Internet Libel Cases
Eric Barendt*
I. Introduction
Among the most difficult issues posed by the global character of
Internet communication is the question of jurisdiction: is it appropriate
for a state court to assume jurisdiction over a communication received in
that state (the state of the "forum"), when it has been placed on the
World Wide Web, or "uploaded," in another state? If the courts of the
forum state exercise jurisdiction and apply their own law, liability may
be imposed on the sender of the communication, even though the state
where the message was uploaded would hold it immune from liability-
either on grounds of ordinary statutory law, or on the basis of a
constitutional provision concerning free speech. This problem is likely
to arise when countries take different approaches to the regulation of free
speech, especially in the context of pornography, hate speech, and
privacy.
This article is concerned with the difficulties that arise in the
context of libel law, where decisions in Australia, England, and Canada
indicate that these countries' courts may assume jurisdiction over, and
eventually award damages in respect of, defamatory Internet
communications emanating from the United States. These decisions may
be regarded as problematic in the United States on the ground that they
wrongly deter free speech on the Internet: for example, website
operators and Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in New York will have to
be aware of the risks of a libel suit in any country where their messages
can be received, at least if there is a claimant in that country whose
reputation has been damaged by those messages. These risks chill
freedom of speech unacceptably and endanger the use of a means of
communication characterised as "the most participatory form of mass
speech yet developed. ...
Part II of this article will examine the well-known decision of the
* Goodman Professor of Media Law, University College London.
1. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp 824, 883 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
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High Court of Australia in Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick.2 It remains the
most important ruling of a common law court in this area. The decision
carefully considered the arguments of principle, in particular, whether
there are good reasons to adopt principles of libel jurisdiction for the
Internet that are different than those developed for the press and
broadcasting media.3 Furthermore, it is the only ruling of the highest
appellate court in any common law jurisdiction to consider these
arguments. Part III of this article will examine some decisions of the
Court of Appeal in England and of the courts in Canada: for the most
part, these courts have adopted an approach similar to that of the High
Court of Australia in rejecting the argument that the traditional approach
to libel jurisdiction should be modified for the Internet. Part IV outlines
three alternative approaches, two of which reflect approaches taken in
the United States to intra-continental libel suits. Courts in the United
States have developed a rule under which they will assume jurisdiction
over an out of forum libel defendant only when it is clear that the
defendant had "targeted" the communication to readers in the forum
state.4 The adoption of this approach by courts outside the United States
might reduce the "chilling effect" of the claimant-friendly libel law in
other countries on American website operators because they would be
exposed to a libel action in other countries only when they direct their
messages at readers in these countries.
Behind the divergent views concerning jurisdiction in Internet libel
cases lie fundamental questions of principle. One such question is the
extent to which the Internet is really different from satellite broadcasting
and other means of global communication. Another question is how the
balance between freedom of speech and reputation should be struck in
this context. A technical issue is also relevant to a discussion of
jurisdiction: is it practical for an ISP to control the geographical
destination of the communications it transmits? These questions are
discussed in Part V. The article concludes in Part VI that there is a case
for some modification of the traditional common law approach to
jurisdiction in Internet libel cases, as a modification would better balance
free speech and reputation interests; however, more extreme arguments
in favor of free speech should be rejected.
II. Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick
Gutnick, a businessman domiciled in Victoria, brought a libel action
in its Supreme Court in response to allegations of money-laundering
2. (2002) 210 C.L.R. 575.
3. See id. at 599-600.
4. See Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 773-74 (1984).
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published by Dow Jones in Barron's Online, a website that material was
uploaded to in New Jersey. Access to the website was primarily by
subscription: there were about 1,700 subscribers from Australia,
including, it seems, a few hundred from Victoria.6 Gutnick and Dow
Jones agreed that the Victoria courts should only decline jurisdiction if,
on the principle of forum non conveniens, it was inappropriate to try the
case in Victoria; they also agreed that the law of the place where the libel
was committed would govern the action.7  However, the parties
disagreed about where the tort was committed. 8 The High Court of
Australia upheld the judgement of Justice Hedigan, from the state
supreme court, that the libel was published, and thus the tort committed,
when the allegations in question were downloaded by Dow Jones
subscribers in Victoria. 9  It was only after the allegations were
downloaded that damage was done to the claimant's reputation.
Therefore, it was proper for the state court to assume jurisdiction and
apply its law. 10 The principles developed in newspaper and broadcasting
cases were applied: if a United States magazine, with circulation in
London or Sydney, defames a businessman domiciled in one of those
cities, the English or New South Wales courts would have jurisdiction to
consider the claimant's libel action."
The High Court rejected Dow Jones' argument that New Jersey's
law should be applied simply because New Jersey was the place where
the publisher maintained its web servers. 12 According to the High Court,
application of New Jersey law would not do justice to the interests of a
claimant in protecting his reputation. 13  The United States' single
publication rule, under which a communication heard at the same time by
two or more people is treated as a single publication, did not affect the
matter: the rule had been formulated to prevent multiplicity of suits
within the United States, and should not be adopted to determine
5. Gutnick, 210 C.L.R. at 594-95.
6. See id. at 643-44.
7. Id. at 596.
8. Id.
9. See id. at 595-96.
10. See id. at 642 (Kirby, J., concurring). Implicit in this determination, there are at
least two questions: whether the forum court has jurisdiction, and if it has jurisdiction,
which law it should apply under its choice of law rules. In practice, the issues are often
conflated. If it is appropriate for the forum court to exercise jurisdiction because the tort
was committed in that state, the forum usually applies the law of that state.
11. See, e.g., Berezovsky v. Forbes, Inc., [2000] 1 W.L.R. 1004 (H.L.) (holding, 3-2,
that a well-known Russian businessman, resident mostly in England, could bring libel
proceedings in the forum in response to statements in Forbes magazine, which had a
circulation of about 2,000 subscribers in the forum (out of a total circulation of 788,000)).
12. Gutnick, 210 C.L.R. at 596, 598-600.
13. Id. at 598-600.
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jurisdiction in international cases. 14 Finally, the High Court did not
believe it was proper to depart from the traditional common law
principles for determining jurisdiction in libel actions to accommodate
the World Wide Web. 15 The judgement of four members of the Court
doubted whether the Internet had a "uniquely broad reach.' 6 Regardless
of the breadth of reach of any means of communication, the High Court
concluded that those who provide information know of the possible far-
reaching effects their information may have and, by implication, take the
legal risks associated with the dissemination of that information.1
7
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Kirby admitted that the
Internet should at least prompt reconsideration of libel rules formulated
for the traditional press and broadcasting media.' 8 It was very difficult
for website operators to determine the geographic location of users
accessing their sites.' 9 According to Justice Kirby, the arrival of the
Internet "suggests a need to adopt new principles.., in responding to
questions of forum or choice of law that identify, by reference to the
conduct that is to be influenced, the place that has the strongest
connection with, or is in the best position to control or regulate, such
conduct."2° Nevertheless, he concluded that it would be wrong for the
High Court to depart from the usual common law rules in this case. 2'
Although the Internet presents novel features, it has much in common
with other global means of communication. Moreover, Justice Kirby
believed it was undesirable to formulate special rules for a particular
technology.23 In particular, the appellant's argument that the place of
uploading or place of publisher's control should be considered the place
of publication would, given the predominance of United States based
web-servers, extend the application of libel laws in the United States to
the prejudice of other countries' laws with which the claimant is more
closely connected.24
Perhaps the most powerful argument for Dow Jones was that, unless
the common law approach was modified, Internet publishers would have
to consider the libel laws of every country in which their messages could
be downloaded in case a claimant chose to bring an action in one of those
14. Id. at 601-05.
15. Id. at 606-07.
16. Id. at 605.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 630-35 (Kirby, J., concurring).
19. Id. at 617 (Kirby, J., concurring).
20. Id. at 625-26 (Kirby, J., concurring).
21. Id. at 629-30 (Kirby, J., concurring).
22. Id. at 630-31 (Kirby, J., concurring).
23. Id. (Kirby, J., concurring).
24. Id. at 633-35 (Kirby, J., concurring).
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countries. 25  Such widespread threat of suit would certainly have a
chilling effect on Internet speech.26 The High Court, however, believed
this fear to be exaggerated. 27  First, a claimant could only obtain
substantial damages if he enjoyed, as Gutnick did in Victoria, a
reputation in the forum.28 Second, a claimant would be reluctant to
commence proceedings unless he was confident that he could enforce a
judgement in his favour.29 Moreover, a publisher can identify the legal
systems in which the publisher may be exposed to libel liability and, in
most cases, will know, or should know, where the potential claimants
live and have reputations.3°
III. English and Canadian Cases
The approach of the English courts in libel cases is similar to that
taken by the High Court of Australia. In the leading English case, King
v. Lewis,3 1 the Court of Appeal upheld the decision of the lower court
that the claimant, a boxing promoter who was a citizen of the United
States and a resident of Florida, could bring a libel action in England in
response to allegations made by the defendants (a world champion
heavyweight boxer, his promotion company, and his New York attorney)
that were posted on a California website.32  The court invoked the
presumption that the appropriate forum for the trial is the place where the
defamation is committed: the defamatory statements were published in
England, and the claimant, a well-known figure in that country, had a
reputation to protect there.33 The Court of Appeal rejected the single
publication rule, as well as an argument that the normal jurisdictional
rules should be modified for Internet publications.34 The Court of
Appeal did, however, suggest that the trial judge in an Internet case
might have wider discretion when determining which forum is
appropriate.35 The trial judge in this case properly exercised his
discretion when he dismissed the defendants' submission that New York
would be a more appropriate forum, pointing out that an action brought
in that state would almost certainly fail.36 Furthermore, the defendant
25. Id. at 598-99.
26. Id.
27. See id. at 596.
28. Id. at 609.
29. Id.
30. Id.; see also id. at 642-43 (Kirby, J., concurring).
31. [2005] E.M.L.R. 4 (C.A.).
32. Id. at 63.
33. Id, at 54-55.
34. Id. at 58.
35. Id. at 58.
36. Id. at 62-63; see also New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 281-82 (1964)
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argued that courts should stay libel proceedings when the defendants do
not "target" their publication at readers (or Internet users) in England.37
While this approach has been adopted in the United States in intra-
continental libel suits, the Court of Appeal dismissed the approach as
uncertain and open to manipulation.
38
A trial judge should consider a number of factors when deciding
whether England is an appropriate forum in which to litigate a libel case
arising from a global publication. Among these factors is the extent to
which the claimant has a real connection with England: if the connection
is only tenuous, the court is unlikely to exercise jurisdiction.39 In light of
this principle, Eady, J., in Richardson v. Schwartzenegger, held that
Anna Richardson-a well-known television host, United Kingdom
citizen, and resident of England--could bring defamation proceedings
against Arnold Schwartzenegger, Sean Walsh, Schwartzenegger's
campaign spokesman, and a Hollywood publicist, Sheryl Main.4 °
Richardson was suing in response to a story in The Los Angeles Times,
published both in hard copy and on the Web, that she had concocted
allegations that Schwarzenegger had sexually assaulted her.4'
Another factor a judge should consider is whether the harmful
statements have been published in other jurisdictions.42 For example, it
would be appropriate for a court to decline jurisdiction where the
claimant has no real connection with England, or where the extent of
publication in England was trivial in relation to other jurisdictions.43 In a
more recent case, the Court of Appeal dismissed, as an abuse of process,
defamation proceedings that were brought in response to serious libel
allegations accessible by hyperlink from the Wall Street Journal On-line:
it was established that only five subscribers had followed the hyperlink,
three of whom were connected with the claimant.44
The Canadian courts apply similar jurisdictional principles. They
assume jurisdiction over foreign defendants where the claimant shows a
real and substantial connection between the action and the forum.45
These principles have recently been applied in a libel case by Justice Pitt
(requiring claimant to show actual malice in a libel action).
37. King, [2005] E.M.L.R. at 58.
38. Id. at 58-59; see also infra Part IV.
39. Richardson v. Schwartzenegger, [2004] E.W.H.C. 2422, para. 23 (Q.B.).
40. Richardson, [2004] E.W.H.C. at paras. 2, 31.
41. Id. at para. 2.
42. Id. at para. 23.
43. Kroch v. Rossell, [1937] 1 All. E.R. 725, 726-27 (C.A.) (involving a claimant
without well-known reputation in England sued in reponse to allegations in French and
Belgian newspapers with small circulation in England).
44. Dow Jones & Co. v. Jameel, [2005] E.M.L.R. 16, 374-75 (C.A).
45. See, e.g., Morguard Investments, Ltd. v. De Savoye, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1077;
Tolofson v. Jensen [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1022.
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of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice when he dismissed a motion by
the The Washington Post to dismiss an action brought by the plaintiff, an
international civil servant, in response to allegations published in 1997
both in the newspaper and on its website.46 Arguably, the case was more
difficult than Gutnick or Richardson because the plaintiff was working in
Kenya when the allegations were published.4 7 The plaintiff had only
settled in Ontario at the end of the previous year, and only became a
Canadian citizen in 2001 .48 However, Justice Pitt did find that the
newspaper "should have reasonably foreseen that the story would follow
the plaintiff wherever he resided. 4 9 He also discussed Dow Jones & Co.
v. Gutnick approvingly, stressing the High Court's statement that those
who put information on the Internet do so knowing the possible reach of
the information.5 ° Finally, while Justice Pitt concluded that the District
of Columbia, where the newspaper is published, would be an equally
appropriate forum, he believed that this fact was an insufficient basis for
disturbing the plaintiff's choice of forum.5 1
IV. Alternatives to the Traditional Approach
There a number of possible alternatives to the traditional common
law approach, under which each state where publication takes place can
claim jurisdiction and may, depending on its choice of law rules, apply
its own substantive law. The first possible alternative is that only the
state where the publisher initially published the communication has
jurisdiction. In Internet cases, the state of initial publication would be
the state where a defamatory message was first placed on a server; the
courts of another state would have to disclaim jurisdiction, even if an
action was brought by a plaintiff wholly resident in that state and the
communication was directed to its public. This alternative is really a
variant of the United States' single publication rule, which is used to
avoid a multiplicity of libel actions in different states based on one
publication. It makes some sense to adopt this type of rule to settle small
differences in the libel law between the states or countries in the United
States or Europe, where there are broad common standards in libel law.
It is much harder to see why jurisdictions such as England, or the states
in Australia, should take this approach when their libel laws differ so
markedly from libel laws in the United States, where the law has
46. Bangoura v. The Washington Post, [2004] 235 D.L.R. (4th) 564, paras. 22, 31,
rev'd, [2005] CarswellOnt 4343.
47. Id. at para. 1.
48. Id. at paras. 1, 25.
49. Id. at para. 24.
50. Id. at paras. 41-45.
51. Id. at para. 37.
2006]
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
become, for constitutional reasons, favourable to defendants. As Justice
Kirby noted in Gutnick, because of the large number of web-servers in
the United States, the adoption of a rule such as the single publication
rule would extend the reach of United States' law, and the jurisdiction of
United States' courts, to defamation actions brought by Australians and
other foreign citizens in response to damage occasioned to their
reputation within their own country as a result of Internet publication.52
As it is difficult for claimants to succeed in a libel action in the United
States, and almost impossible for public officials and figures to do so,
such a change may cause worthy reputations to go unprotected. Thus,
while the traditional jurisdictional approach may chill Internet speech,
the adoption of the single publication rule might well entail the
abandonment of reputation rights.
Under a second alternative, courts in the forum could only exercise
jurisdiction in Internet (or other) libel suits emanating from another state
when it is clear that the defendant has "targeted" the communication at
readers in the forum state. This approach has been adopted in a number
of recent United States cases, notably Young v. New Haven Advocate
53
and Revell v. Lidov.54 However, as already noted, this approach has been
rejected by the Court of Appeal in England as lacking certainty and as
open to manipulation.55 The judges in that case did not explain this view.
Nevertheless, it is unclear what "targeting" really means: is it crucial that
the website containing the defamatory allegations is primarily directed to
readers in the forum state, or only that the particular defamatory
allegations were directed to readers in the forum state? Additionally,
"targeted" could be interpreted as meaning the allegations were targeted
at a plaintiff resident in a particular forum, regardless of whether or not
the majority of readers interested in the allegations concerning the
plaintiff also lived there. In Young, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held that the courts in West Virginia could not assume
jurisdiction in a libel action brought by a resident of that state, although it
was clear that the allegations were directed against him; instead, what
mattered was that the article was of most interest to readers in
52. See Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick, (2002) 210 C.L.R. 575, 633.
53. 315 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that West Virginia courts have no
jurisdiction to try a libel action brought by the prison warden in that state in response to
allegations published by a Connecticut newspaper on its website concerning treatment of
Connecticut prisoners sent to serve their sentence in West Virginia jails; the allegations
were of primary concern to, or targeted at, readers in Connecticut).
54. 317 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that Texas courts have no jurisdiction over
a libel action brought by a Texas resident in response to allegations on an Internet
bulletin board hosted by Columbia University when the allegations made no reference to
Texas, and the article was not directed at Texas readers).
55. King v. Lewis, [2005] E.M.L.R. 4, 58-59.
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Connecticut, as it discussed the implications of sending convicted
criminals in that state to jail in West Virginia.56 It seems, therefore, that
the crucial question for the court is whether the publication targeted
readers in the forum state. This basis for jurisdiction might not do justice
to the interests of a plaintiff, resident in one state and with significant
standing in that community, whose reputation has been damaged by a
publication of more concern to readers in another state.
These difficulties would not occur under the third alternative
approach: the courts of the forum could only assume jurisdiction over
defamatory Internet communications uploaded by a defendant in another
state when the defendant should have foreseen that the claimant would
suffer a loss to reputation rights in the forum state as a result of computer
users' downloading the allegations. The adoption of this approach would
satisfy some of the objections of the High Court of Australia in
Gutnick.57  In particular, a defendant would not have to check the
defamation laws of every country from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe;
instead, he would only be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of a
state in which he should reasonably foresee that a publication would
damage reputation rights.58 The Young case would probably be decided
differently, as it was surely foreseeable by the publisher of the New
Haven newspaper that the reputation of the West Virginia prison warden
would be injured. 59 Equally, the English Court of Appeal might have
decided King differently, as it was far from clear that the defendants
should have appreciated that the reputation of the boxing promoter, a
resident of Florida and a United States' citizen, would be injured in
England.6 °
V. Some Issues of Principle
This article has discussed, in a technical manner, the approaches
which have been taken, or which could be taken, to jurisdiction and
choice of law disputes in Internet libel cases. But underlying the
question of which approach is most appropriate are two fundamental
issues of legal principle and, possibly, a technological question pertinent
to the Internet. This Part will address these matters, as a sensible
resolution to the problems of jurisdiction and choice of law is otherwise
impossible.
56. Young, 315 F.3d at 262-64.
57. See supra notes 12-30 and accompanying text.
58. See Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick, (2002) 210 C.L.R. 575, 609.
59. See Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2002).
60. See King v. Lewis, [2005] E.M.L.R. 4 (C.A.).
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A. In This Context, is the Internet Different Than Other Means of
Global Communication?
The High Court of Australia in Gutnick questioned whether the
Internet was really different than television services, such as satellite
broadcasting, in its reach.61 A global broadcasting service such as CNN
or BBC Worldwide is as readily obtainable in a number of countries as
any website. Of course, the Internet is different from broadcasting or
newspapers in that it enables individuals and small businesses to
disseminate their messages around the world as freely as giant media
corporations. Thus, the Internet is rightly regarded as a significant
development for free speech.
The question, however, is whether the jurisdictional rules developed
for the traditional mass media should be abandoned. Certainly, the
imposition of libel liability, resulting from the assumption of jurisdiction
by courts in Australia or England, might deter individuals and companies
from using the Internet, or at least persuade them to use it more
cautiously. But is this wrong? A defamatory allegation put on the
Internet can spread around the world immediately, causing potentially
enormous damage to its victim's reputation.62  Moreover, while
newspaper and broadcasting lawyers check that their journalists and
other contributors do not infringe upon libel laws, there are no similar
controls on the participants to a bulletin board or discussion group.
Thus, while the Internet may well be different from other means of
global communication, the differences can be used to argue either for or
against the application of traditional jurisdictional and other libel law
rules, which may lead to the imposition of liability for libel.
B. The Balance Between Free Speech and Reputation Rights on the
Internet
The real disagreement of principle concerns the balancing of free
speech and reputation rights. Gutnick, and other English decisions
adopting its approach to libel jurisdiction and choice of law in Internet
cases, allow actions to be determined on the basis of what may be
regarded as the claimant-friendly defamation laws of Australia or
England. On the other hand, the adoption of United States' principles,
such as the single publication rule or the "targeting" approach, would
mean that, in many circumstances, the forum court would have to deny
61. Gutnick, 210 C.L.R. at 605.
62. See Michael Hadley, The Gertz Doctrine and Internet Defamation, 84 VA. L.
REv. 477, 491-98 (1998).
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jurisdiction, resulting in an action being able to be brought only where
the communication was uploaded to the server. Defamation proceedings
would almost certainly fail in the United States, particularly if the
claimant were a public official or public figure. Hence, the dispute about
the appropriate state for jurisdictional purposes becomes a surrogate for
the disagreement about the correct balancing of free speech and
reputation rights.
It is, of course, natural for English or Australian courts to take the
view that they have jurisdiction to hear a libel action brought by a
claimant whose reputation has clearly suffered in the forum as a result of
allegations originally published elsewhere. In the exercise of their
discretion of whether to hear the action, one consideration is how much
weight to give an argument that courts in the United States will refuse to
enforce foreign libel judgements which could not be obtained in the
United States without infringing on First Amendment rights.63  In
Gutnick, Justice Kirby implied that Australian courts should at least take
this argument into account when considering whether it would beproper
to assume jurisdiction or apply the law of New South Wales or
Victoria. 64
Nevertheless, it would appear to be a mistake to give this argument
much weight. First, it confers on United States courts a decisive voice
on the balancing of reputation and free speech rights: an Australian or
English judge would in effect be ruling that he would not consider a libel
action, in other respects properly before him, because any judgement in
favour of the claimant would be regarded as contrary to United States
public policy, and thus unenforceable. Second, the argument assumes
that the only, or principal, object of a libel action is to obtain an
enforceable award of damages. Contrary to this assumption, a libel
verdict in London or Sydney would vindicate the claimant's reputation
rights, or perhaps give emotional satisfaction to the claimant, even
though he could not obtain financial compensation, unless the United
States defendant had financial assets in the jurisdiction. The non-
enforceability of foreign judgements that contravene the First
Amendment may alleviate United States defendants' fears of violating
the libel laws of other countries, but this does not provide a strong reason
why courts in other countries should abstain from exercising jurisdiction,
or applying their own defamation laws, when it would otherwise be
proper to do so.
63. See Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications, Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1992); Matusevitch v. Telnikoff, 877 F. Supp. 1 (D. D.C. 1995).
64. Gutnick, 210 C.L.R. at 628-29 (Kirby, J., concurring).
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C. A Technological Argument
Many free speech arguments concerning the Internet have
particularly strong force because the disseminators of messages and
website operators normally have no means of controlling who can
download communications on the Internet. The United States Supreme
Court has, for example, struck down Congressional attempts to limit the
dissemination of pornography on the Internet because it is difficult, if not
impossible, to ensure that indecent material is kept away from children
without also preventing adults from accessing the material. 65  This
difficulty was appreciated in Gutnick.6 6 Unless the website operator uses
a subscription system, there is no way in which it can determine in
advance the geographic location of users accessing messages on its site.
Furthermore, a subscription system is far from wholly reliable, as
residents in Australia could use a United States credit card and billing
address to secure access to an American site. Nevertheless, future
technological developments might make it possible for an operator to use
software to ensure that its messages are not communicated to
jurisdictions where there is reason to believe that the courts would
exercise jurisdiction to hear defamation proceedings and impose liability.
The availability of such software would weaken the argument of website
operators and ISPs that their speech on the Internet might lead to the
imposition of liability in a range of claimant-friendly jurisdictions. On
the other hand, operators can plausibly argue that the use of geographical
location software is expensive and unreliable; moreover, users may find
ways to evade access restrictions imposed by its employment.
67
VI. Conclusion
Jurisdiction in Internet libel cases has become a controversial issue.
It presents, in a particularly acute form, the divergent approaches of the
United States courts and those of other common law jurisdictions to the
balancing of free speech and reputation rights. It is difficult to believe
that this conflict will be resolved by an international convention.
Moreover, it would be unreasonable to expect the courts of either the
United States or of other countries to abandon principles of libel
formulated for decades in the context of the traditional press and
65. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004).
It is relatively easy to control access to pornographic material by making it available only
on a subscription basis and checking that subscribers are adults with a credit card,
although a subscription system may be expensive to operate.
66. Gutnick, 210 C.L.R. at 617-18 (Kirby, J., concurring).
67. For consideration of these issues, see Horatia Muir Watt, Yahoo! Cyber-
Collision of Cultures: Who Regulates? 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 673 (2003).
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broadcasting media.
There is no clear reason why the Internet should be singled out for
special treatment. It is widely used by individuals and enhances their
freedom of speech, but equally, the Internet has an enormous potential to
spread defamatory material and inflict damage on individuals and
business. At most, the courts of England and other common law
countries should be more willing to exercise their discretion not to hear a
libel actions underforum non conveniens principles, especially when it is
clear that the defendant had no reason to foresee that its statements
would damage the claimant's reputation in the forum. The difficulties
discussed in this article might be lessened by a more flexible approach.
However, it would be wrong for courts to abandon their traditional
approach simply because their decisions would not be enforced in the
United States.

